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DRAFTING CONVEYANCES OF MINERAL AND
ROYALTY INTERESTS
JOSEPH

R.

GERAUD*

When I first gave consideration to preparing material in the general
area of the mechanics of drafting, and the differences between reservations
and assignments of mineral interests and royalty interests, it appeared to
me that there was much that could be said about the subject. However,
judgment as to the particular areas of this branch of the law to be
discussed here had to be exercised to attempt to make an half hour of
discussion worthwhile.
In the process of continually reviewing new cases in the oil and gas
field that turn on problems of construing instruments transferring mineral
interests or royalty interests, I am always disturbed by the amount of
litigation that is continually arising because of disagreement as to the
interpretation of words and the resulting resort to various means of
ascertaining the intention of the parties. It is true that many current
disputes are based upon instruments that were drafted years ago. This
holds the hope that parties currently concerned with drafting instruments
do have guideposts for their efforts, but such a hope has not been fully
realized as evidenced by recent cases involving draftsmen's products of
recent vintage. In looking for the underlying causes of litigation concerning transfers of oil and gas interests, there is no question but what
the draftsmen of instruments often fail to state the intention of the
parties in an unambiguous form. However, it is also true, particularly
in jurisdictions without a substantial number of decisions in oil and gas,
that courts have found ambiguity in situations in which many would
agree that it did not exist. Time does not permit discussion of the many
factors which have led to differing results in interpretation, and so hereafter we will look at the subject from the standpoint of minimum and
basic principles involved in the transfer of mineral and royalty interests.
It seems to me that before anyone should endeavor to execute a
transfer of any type of mineral or royalty interest in oil and gas, he should
understand the nature of the beast and the parts into which it may be
carved to serve the purposes of oil and gas operations, as well as the names
and labels which courts have accepted as describing a certain part.
Further, the draftsman should also clearly ascertain what the parties
think they are transferring. A recent Montana decision is typical of the
latter problem. In Voyta v. Clonts, (1958, 328 P.2d 655, 9 0 & G R 522)
a contract for sale provided for retention by the seller of a percentage
of "landowner's mineral rights." At trial of the case both parties admitted that they interpreted this provision as merely referring to the
*Joseph R. Geraud received his LL.B. degree from the University of Wyoming in 1950.
Mr. Geraud is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming.
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division of the royalty vested in the landowner under the existing oil and
gas lease. It is perhaps easy to appreciate how a landowner may think of
the receipt of royalty as the extent of his mineral interest, since he knows
that what he receives is royalty from his minerals under lease.
Let us briefly examine the ownership in fee simple of our favorite
hypothetical farm, Blackacre. If there are no prior reservations of
minerals in landowner's chain of title to Blackacre, we can say that Landowner has the following rights to oil and gas or other minerals in his
land, which are summarized by saying that he is the mineral interest
owner.
1. He has certain rights which we can call "executive rights." That
is, he has control of the minerals. He can explore for them, he
can develop and produce the minerals, or he can execute a lease
transferring these specific rights.
2. He also possesses certain non-executive rights, which are rights
that are normally considered incidents of the mineral interest and
which follow transfers of the mineral interest. These are the
right to royalty, bonus, and delay rental.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has recognized that the mineral
interest may be severed from the surface and constitutes a severed mineral
estate which is "land." This Landowner may sever the mineral estate by
grant or by reservation, and it would further appear that inasmuch as this
is an estate, the duration of such an estate would be in terms of a fee
simple unless otherwise limited. Inasmuch as the mineral interest is an
estate and land, if Landowner desires to convey his mineral interest, he
should use an instrument which measures up to requirements for a
transfer of land. Such an instrument would be a deed, or "mineral
deed." The deed may convey with warranties of title, or it may be by
quitclaim. While I have indicated a label here (deed or mineral deed)
it must be kept in mind that courts have not appeared to be overly concerned with the particular type of instrument utilized to transfer mineral
interests, for you can find instruments labeled as "Royalty Assignments"
which have been interpreted as transfers of mineral interests. Thus,
while I cannot say that it is impossible to transfer mineral interests by an
instrument which purports to "assign, sell and transfer" and does not
employ words of a statutory form of deed or common law words of grant or
bargain and sale, I would say that the draftsman should rely upon principles
of conveyancing in preparing a transfer of the mineral interest.
If Landowner decides to quitclaim or warrant his mineral interest,
the next critical area is the specific words used to describe the mineral
interest. If it is intended to accomplish a complete severance of the
mineral estate, the description of the property could be: "all oil, gas, and
other minerals in and under Blackacre." Note that I did specifically
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mention only oil and gas. While I believe that the majority of jurisdictions have treated oil and gas as being mineral, we have not had the issue
specifically litigated in this state. It is also to be pointed out that courts
are not in agreement as to the interpretation of "minerals" in a reservation. However, the majority view appears to be that the term describes
all substances that may be severed from the soil for useful purposes, and
that have an independent value when so severed. On the other hand,
other courts have attempted to give effect to a definition of minerals from
the standpoint of what the understanding of the parties was as to substances known to be classified as minerals. Under the latter view such a
mineral as uranium would not be considered a part of the minerals
granted if a mineral deed prepared forty years ago was under consideration. Such an interpretation could be avoided by adding the phrase,
"whether presently known as minerals or hereafter found to be useful in
the arts and sciences when severed from the land." On the other hand,
it may be desirable to convey only specific minerals by name so as to
clearly define the burden the surface owner will bear. Thus you create
a mineral fee only in certain minerals. Also note that I said "minerals
in and under Blackacre." The prepositions used to relate minerals to the
tract should be carefully considered. Addition of the words "or that may
be produced and saved" has caused courts to interpret this grant as the
grant of a royalty interest.
If on the other hand the Landowner desires to retain the mineral
interest and convey the surface, the severance is accomplished by a deed
with a reservation of all oil, gas and other minerals. With regard to
reservations, it is well to note that a whole body of mystic common law
surrounds the distinction between an "exception" and a "reservation."
Rather than become involved in an explanation of the distinction, I think
the draftsman can proceed upon the judicial principle that the intention
of the parties governs, and courts have been liberal in not recognizing
any distinction between a reservation and an exception when it appears
that it was intended to vest the grantor with the mineral estate. However,
it is common practice in deeds to use the phraseology "excepting and
reserving unto the grantor and his heirs and assigns forever all oil, gas,
and other minerals."
After the foregoing transaction, we may say that Landowner is now
the owner of the severed mineral interest, and he may execute further
conveyances of his interest or lease it for 't&velopment. First, he is free -to
transfer fractional parts of his estate by deed. If he transfers V of all
oil, gas and other minerals in and under Blackacre to John Doe, Landowner and Doe are co-tenants in the estate. This means Doe has the
same executive and non-executive rights with regard to the minerals as
does Landowner. Since multiple conveyances of mineral interests may
create many co-owners with the power to lease, such transactions frequently will reserve the power to lease Blackacre in one person so as to
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expedite leasing. Second: Instead of conveying an interest in the mineral
estate, Landowner can transfer one of the incidents of his estate. The
most common fragment of ownership transferred is a part of Landowner's
right to receive royalty.
It is at this point difficulties seem to arise. "Royalty" has two commonly accepted meanings (1) the landowner's share of production;
(2) or more broadly, a share of production. The latter term, a share of
production, is more useful generally in that any person entitled to a
portion of oil and gas produced may divide this right by transfer by
"royalty assignments."
If Landowner is perfectly certain that he wishes to part with a part
of his right to royalty he may do so in terms of a stated fraction of all
production from the premises (1/32 royalty of all oil and gas produced
from Blackacre), or a stated fraction of all royalties payable under future
leases, assuming no lease in existence ( of all royalty paid on oil and
gas produced from Blackacre-assuming a lease with a '/ royalty reserved,
the assignee would receive 1/32). Time does not permit reference to the
innumerable cases litigated to determine whether the stated fraction was
to apply to total production or to the royalty reserved in a subsequent
lease. But bear in mind that when the preposition of appears in an
assignment it means "times." A person cannot be too careful in expressing
the intention of the parties in this regard. If it is a royalty interest that is
being transferred, the assignee of such interest does not receive any power
to develop or lease the land for development; he does not receive any
right to bonus, delay rental or any other royalty. I have heard it suggested that a draftsman in addition to being careful to designate this
interest as "royalty" to be paid from oil and gas produced from Blackacre could well go on to affirmatively state that the grantor retains sole
right to develop minerals, to execute leases and receive all benefits of the
lease in the form of bonus and rentals. Such an approach would clearly
negate any possible argument that the assignee was intended to receive
other rights incident to the mineral estate.
The royalty I have been speaking of, which is created by the mineral
interest owner, is called a perpetual non-partcipating royalty when no
limitation is placed upon its duration. It may be limited as to time, as
for the duration of a specific oil and gas lease upon the premises. It
should be remembered that the holder of a royalty interest receives a
stated fraction of oil cost free, whereas if a fraction of the mineral interest
is transferred, the grantee is a co-tenant in the mineral estate and entitled
only to his proportion of production less the costs of production. Normally
the latter will have to join in a lease to get development and take his
proportionate share of the usual 1A royalty.
Inasmuch as the royalty owner does not receive any power to develop
or lease, he may well desire to have certain covenants included in the
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instrument of assignment relative to how the owner of the mineral interest
will exercise his powers.
Let us now look at the situation in which the owner of a mineral
estate has executed a lease for oil and gas development. After the lease,
the lessor has the following incidents of ownership: (1) Right to royalty,
usually 1/8, as provided in the lease; (2) Right to delay rentals and bonus
as contracted for in the lease; (3) A reversion in the full incidents of the
mineral estate. A conveyance of a part of the mineral interest will now
also entitle the grantee to a proportionate share of rentals and royalty paid
pursuant to the existing lease, unless the instrument expresses a contrary
intention. Oftentimes draftsmen spell out the division of the royalty and
rental in the instrument of conveyance. Care should be taken when
doing this to watch the fractions utilized. If A conveys 2 the mineral
estate, and wants to make clear
of royalties payable under the lease
are to be paid to -the grantee, it may be stated in this fashion. There have
been instances in which 1/2 the mineral estate was granted and 1/16 of the
royalty. While 1/16 may be /2 of 1/8, the court may decide that the
grantee was to receive 1/16 of 1, or 1/128.
In this situation the mineral conveyance has at times recited that
the conveyance is "subject to an existing lease." This has led to considerably variety of interpretation and confusion, when nothing else is
used to indicate what was intended by the phrase. Does it mean that the
grantee gets only the reversion? Or does it mean he merely ratifies the
terms of the lease? Suffice it to say at this time, that the draftsman can
create greater certainty by setting forth the rights intended that the
grantee acquire in the existing lease.
After the execution of the lease, it is clear -that the lessee has acquired
a certain number of the original incidents of the mineral estate: (1) Right
to explore and develop; (2) Right to ?/g of the oil and gas; (3) Other
contractual rights set forth in the lease. Just as the mineral estate owner
may transfer different incidents of his estate, so may the lessee transfer
incidents of his leasehold. The most common incident severed from the
working interest (that is the lessee's interest in y8 of production which
bears the expense of production) is a fraction of the y8 production. The
severance may be accomplished by assignment or reservation, and is
normally referred to as an over-riding royalty. An overriding royalty may
be defined as an interest in oil and gas produced at the surface, free of
the expense of production, and in addition to the usual landowner's
royalty reserved to the lessor in an oil and gas lease. It is quite common
in farm-out agreements and in other assignments of leases that the assignor
will reserve an overriding royalty. Such an interest may frequently be
assigned as device for obtaining funds to finance drilling operations.
While the landowner's royalty is typically 18, there is no uniformity in the
size of the overriding royalty. It is usually stated in terms of a fraction,
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and it is at this point that the draftsman must exercise care. Inasmuch
as the person creating the interest is entitled to only 7 of the production,
it must be ascertained whether the parties intend the stated fraction, such
as 1/32, to apply to all of the production from Blackacre or to only y/
of the production. The assignment or reservation should be clearly
drafted to indicate the parties intent, whether it be "a 1/32 royalty of all
oil and gas produced from Blackacre," or "1/32 royalty of Y of the oil
and gas produced from Blackacre."
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of overriding royalty is that
its duration is limited by the duration of the lease under which it is
created. Thus when the lessee of Blackacre assigns the lease to B, reserving
a 1/32 overriding royalty, the continued existence of this interest depends
on the acts of B in keeping the lease alive by paying delay rentals, pro-.
ducing oil before the expiration of the primary term, etc. Because of this
characteristic of overriding royalty, it is common in assignment agreements
to provide for notice by -the assignee to the assignor of intention to allow
the lease to lapse and in such event to require the reassignment of the
lease. It is also common to find other provisions that extend the overriding royalty to any extensions or renewals of the lease.
I would now like to discuss what I have called "double fraction"
problems in my outline. The double fraction problem arises whenever
the grantor of an interest owns less than the entire fee simple and is going
to grant or reserve a fractional part. In such a situation the draftsman
must always bear in mind that there should be a clear statement of the
basis to which the fraction conveyed applies. As just pointed out with
regard to overriding royalty, the draftsman must be careful to clearly
state whether the override applies -to the assignor's share of production or
to the totil production.
However, the double fraction difficulty arises in many other types
of situations. Suppose A owned an undivided !/2 interest in Blackacre.
A conveyed "All of A's right, title and interest in Blackacre." By a later
provision in the same instrument A reserved to himself "1/32 part of all
oil on and under the said land and premises herein described and conveyed." The question here is "Did A reserve 1/32 of all oil in and under
Blackacre?" To answer this question we must first ascertain the meaning
of the phrase "all oil on and under the said land and premises herein
described and conveyed." What was conveyed? The "land" or just "A's
interest in Blackacre" which was 1/2. This makes a difference since the
1/32 applies to all oil under the land, or the 1/32 applies to A's 1/2 interest
which would result in a 1/64 interest. In the Texas case of Hooks v.
Neill, (21 S.W.2d 532) it was held that the "land" conveyed was the
"interest" conveyed and not the physical land. In other words, although
the draftsman referred to the "land" conveyed the court gave land a dual
meaning-it can be a physical object or it can be the interest conveyed.

iMINERAL LAW SECTION

So the point is that whenever the grantor owns less than the entire fee,
the draftsman must use care in reserving a fractional interest to clearly
indicate whether the fraction applies to all oil underlying a certain described tract, or whether it applies to the interest conveyed.
That is one type of fraction problem. Another was recently illustrated
in the Wyoming case of Body v. McDonald (1959, 334 P.2d 513, 10 0. & G.
R. 103). To illustrate, let us say A conveyed Blackacre to B excepting and
interest to all oil, petroleum, and other petroleum products.
reserving
Shortly thereafter, B conveyed to C with an identical reservation.
C
knew of the prior reservation at the time of his obtaining a deed. Some
forty odd years later C brought suit .to quiet title to three-fourths of the
mineral estate and was successful. Now you will recall that there had
been two separate reservations of a 1/4 interest in grantors in the chain of
title. However, all deeds had been warranty deeds, and the court held
that since B warranted Blackacre to C with an exception and reservation
of only
of the oil interest, the deed effectively warranted the surface
and 3/4 of all the oil rights. By such a warranty B is estopped to deny
that C owns that quantum of the estate. Although C knew of both reservations, estoppel by deed is not to be considered as resting upon the same
principles as an equitable estoppel, as a warranty is put in a deed for the
express purpose of estopping the grantor to the extent of the words used.
This decision clearly stresses the importance of the draftsman, who prepares a warranty deed, knowing the status of the -title so as to specifically
except prior reservations of minerals, or include a blanket exception of all
prior reservations of record..
Double fraction problem can arise in many forms in oil and gas
conveyancing. A recent 10th Circuit case (Brenimer v. Cockburn, C.A.
10th Cir. Wyo., 254 F.2d 821) presented a situation in which A had
acquired a fifty per cent working interest as part of an operating agreement in which he assumed the development obligations. Thereafter he
made assignments of "1% of all the oil and gas hereafter developed or
discovered . . . in the lands . . . described in the oil and gas leases . . .
pursuant to the Operating Agreement." The issue that went -to the 10th
circuit was whether the 1% referred to all of the production from the
leases, or just to the 50% interest owned by A (assuming normal leases
and no overrides, this would be 1% of 50% of 871/2%). The court held
that the instrument assigned 1% of all oil and gas produced from the
land. So again we have a situation in disagreement which arose because
the parties could find a basis for arguing as to whether the 1%7 referred
to the assignor's "interest" or to the total physical production from
described land.
The last and perhaps most complex type of fraction problem I want
to mention is presented in the case of Benge v. Scharbauer (259 S.W.2d
166, 2 0. & G.R. 1350, Tex. Sup. Ct. 1953).
A owned the surface and
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of the minerals. A conveyed to B and-granted Blackacre. The grant
was followed by a reservation to A of 3/8 of the mineral interest, less the
power to lease, which power was conveyed to B. Thereafter A attempted
to reserve, expressly, 3/ of bonuses, delay rentals and royalties. How do you
define mineral ownership between A and B?
3/

Note the problem again. At the time of A's conveyance there is
outstanding 2/8 of the mineral interest, but A attempted to reserve 3/8.
This would give the grantee B, only a 3/8 interest. But by applying estoppel
by deed, we reach the result that B must get r/8 of the mineral interest, so
that A effectively reserved only a 1/8 interest. This is in accord with
accepted doctrine. But how about the right to bonus, rental, and royalty?
Normally these rights are commensurate with the extent of mineral
ownership. In the fact situation, however, the Court concluded that the
parties had indicated a specific agreement that A was to receive 3/8 of
these incidents that arise pursuant to the contractual terms of a lease.
Hence, the decision in effect recognized a conveyance with a split personality. A owns 1/8 of the mineral interest, but is entitled to 3/8 of the
royalty, bonus and delay rentals.
Perhaps I have attempted to oversimplify problems in the drafting
of mineral or royalty conveyances. But I do feel that careful consideration
and analysis of the nature of the interests will inevitably lead to careful
draftsmanship that will so clearly express the parties' intent, that litigation
will not follow. Of course there can be no guarantee. This is illustrated
by the recent case of Corlett v. Cox (333 P.2d 619). There a warranty deed
contained the following clause: "hereby reserves 614% of all gas, oil and
minerals that may be produced on any or all the above mentioned land,
or in other words reserves 12 of the usual 1/8 royalty." I think that I
can say that most oil and gas people would construe this as the reservation
of a royalty interest. However, there was no oil and gas lease in existence
at the -time, and the court concluded after a review of the theoretical nature
of ownership of oil and gas that the parties actually intended the reservation of a mineral interest. The point of this illustration is merely to remind
you that draftsmen must constantly be aware of the jurisdiction's theory of
ownership of oil and gas, and its incidents. If there are'no past guiding
decisions, extreme care must be exercised in spelling out the intended
effect of the conveyance upon all of the parts into which mineral ownership can be divided.

